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Too Big To Fail: Limiting Public Risk in Hydropower
Licensing
Joshua H. Viers and Daniel M. Nover
The financial crisis of 2008 resulted in widespread economic distress
and near collapse of the global financial sector. While the causes of the
crisis were complex, the emerging corrective outcomes provide insight as to
how large, interconnected institutions with direct oversight of high-valued
resources should be regulated. In the case of the financial sector, improved
regulatory oversight has resulted in a series of changes for banks that are
deemed too big to fail. In other words, banks—whose financial assets and
obligations are so valuable that their potential demise would have
catastrophic and cascading impacts to other connected institutions and
constituents in “downstream” transactions—are now required to limit their
exposure to internal and external system shocks. In response to this crisis,
methods to assess and reduce relative risk and exposure, as well as the
development of preparedness and response strategies in the event of future
adverse conditions, were generated via new fiscal and monetary policies.
These policies have centered on four pragmatic reforms: stress testing,
performance monitoring, triggers for remediation, and escrow accounts to
maintain liquidity.1
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1. John Maxfield, The Dodd-Frank Act Explained, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 2,
2017, 2:39 PM), https://perma.cc/ZV9S-AQL7. (Ultimately these reforms, and
others, were included in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act.)
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Large-scale water management systems in general, and California’s
water management system in particular, provide a good analogue to the
financial system. In California, our water system meets the needs of more
than 39 million people, supports the irrigated production of over a third of
the nation’s vegetables and two-thirds of the nation’s fruits and nuts, and
powers the fifth largest economy in the world.2 However, it is also highly
decentralized and routinely subject to system shocks, such as prolonged
drought. In essence, our water management system is too big to fail. We
argue here that similar policy reforms are necessary to reduce future system
shocks in water management systems caused by global climate warming and
subsequent alteration to regional hydroclimatic regimes, and thereby reduce
exposure of downstream beneficiaries to unnecessary risk. While such
reforms in the financial sector were reactionary, the case for proactive
climate change adaptation in water management—and in hydropower
relicensing specifically—has been made previously because the stakes are
too high and the risks too great.3
These observations are especially important today as a recent spate of
bills in the U.S. Congress have attempted to roll back regulation of water
management activities, such as the most recent H.R. 23 Gaining
Responsibility on Water Act of 2017.4 Other bills have focused on
deregulation of hydropower production in the United States.5 These bills
cite, among many things, the desire to expedite future dam and hydropower
development.6 In particular, the “improvements” sought by the latter bill are
to lessen protection for the environment and limit scientific scrutiny by
utilities regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission seeking to

2. See State of Cal. Dep’t of Fin., E-1 POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR CITIES,
COUNTIES AND THE STATE WITH ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE (2016-2017),
https://perma.cc/AGP5-3SQU; see also Cal. Dep’t of Food and Agric.,
CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION STATISTICS 2016 CROP YEAR REPORT
(2016), https://perma.cc/44G7-YPL9 (California’s share of global gross
domestic product (GDP) varies from year to year, but is routinely in the top
ten compared to other countries.).
3. Joshua A. Viers, Hydropower Relicensing and Climate Change, 47 J. OF AM.
WATER RESOURCES ASS’N. 655, 655–661 (2011).
4. Richard Frank, California Members of Congress Seek to Eviscerate State
Water & Environmental Law, LEGAL PLANET (July 10, 2017),
https://perma.cc/9J43-NDER.
5. Hydropower Improvement Act, S.1236, 114th Cong. (2015); Energy
Policy Modernization Act, S. 2012, 114th Cong. (2015).
6. Senator Lisa Murkowski & Jay Faison, Stop Wasting America’s
Hydropower Potential, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com
/2016/01/14/opinion/stop-wasting-americas-hydropower-potential.html.
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extend hydropower operation licenses under the Federal Power Act (as
amended).7 We argue that hydropower—particularly in California, which
depends on a large and complex network of hydropower facilities—would
benefit from more robust regulation given anticipated shifts to the
hydroclimatic regime due to global climate change.

Climate Change & Hydropower Relicensing
In the United States, the federal agency responsible for regulating the
generation, transmission and sale of energy is the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), which regulates the transportation of oil in interstate
commerce, the transmission of natural gas, and licenses nonfederal
hydropower projects. The stated mission of FERC is to “assist consumers in
obtaining reliable, efficient and sustainable energy services at a reasonable
cost through appropriate regulatory and market means.”8 Although largely
unknown to most Americans, FERC has enormous sway in how hydropower
generation is conducted, and ultimately who, if anyone, is responsible for its
potential negative effects.
Hydropower is a renewable source of energy and represents
approximately twenty percent of the world’s energy supply.9 As an energy
source, it is viewed as both vulnerable to global climate warming10 and an
asset to reduce climate-altering emissions.11 Hydropower is particularly
vulnerable to hydrologic alteration driven by global climate warming12 as its

7. Ben Adler, Is Obama Blocking Smart Hydropower Development?, GRIST (Jan.
27, 2016), https://perma.cc/8K37-94F6; see also Senator Lisa Murkowski & Jay
Faison, supra note 6 (Pacific Gas & Electric Vice President Randal Livingston
provided evidence to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
Livingston cited specific grievances that are remedied by limiting nonlicensee data collection and limiting interpretation of project nexus
determination, both of which would serve to limit scientific scrutiny of
proposed actions).
8. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, https://perma.cc/8X4BWD48.
9. Cutler Cleveland, ENCYCLOPEDIA ENERGY, 325–332 (1st ed. 2004).
10. Bernhard Lehner et al., The Impact of Global Change on the Hydropower
Potential of Europe a Model-Based Analysis, 33 ENERGY POLICY 839, 839—855
(2005).
11. Lea Kosnik, The Potential of Water Power in the Fight Against Global
Warming in the U.S., 36 ENERGY POLICY 3252, 3252–3265 (2008).
12. Zbigniew W. Kundzewicz and Luis José Mata, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
WORKING GROUP II: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 211–272 (Alfred
Becker et al. eds., 2007).
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generation depends directly on the magnitude and timing of available “fuel,”
or stream discharge. Hydropower is also increasingly the focus of regulatory
agencies trying to more effectively manage multiple ecosystem service
benefits.13 These issues are particularly topical in California, as the state
grapples with a water supply that is increasingly stretched between
numerous demands, including energy production, domestic, industrial and
agricultural water uses, flood control, recreation, environmental
conservation, and hydropower generation.14
Recently, climate change research has focused on the increasing
frequency and documentation of extreme weather events, such as droughts,
floods, and hurricanes. The vulnerability of California’s water system to
these types of climate shocks has been on stark display over the past several
years. Following the prolonged 2012-2016 drought, which created the very
real possibility that hydropower facilities would not be able to meet their
electricity generation goals, California experienced what is, by most
accounts, a record precipitation year.15 As a result, catastrophic flooding
occurred across the state, with enormous damage to property and
infrastructure, the most visible of which was the spillway of the Oroville
Dam.
Several environmental advocacy groups had previously identified
design flaws in the Oroville Dam, the largest reservoir in California’s State
Water Project, which centered around the potential for downstream risks to
public safety.16 These concerns were largely dismissed by the California
Department of Water Resources (DWR), the operator of Oroville Dam, and by
FERC during the original licensing.17 Interestingly, the Oroville Dam was
slated for relicensing in 2007, but the process had been delayed for
approximately ten years before an extreme atmospheric river event in 2017

13. Birgitta Malm Renöfält, Effects of Hydropower Generation and
Opportunities for Environmental Flow Management in Swedish Riverine Ecosystems, 55
FRESHWATER BIOLOGY 49, 49–67 (2009).
14. Ellen Hanak et al., Managing California’s Water from Conflict to
Reconciliation, PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, 2011, at 102.
15. Press Release, Northern Sierra Precipitation Sets Water Year
Record, Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. (Apr. 12, 2017).
16. Motion to Intervene of Friends of the River Sierra Club South Yuba
Citizens League at 14-16, Project No. 2100-52 (Submitted before the end of
the filing period to provide the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission staff
and the licensee with an early presentation of the licensing issue.).
17. Sam Stanton & Ryan Sabalow, State Water Officials Were Warned of
Oroville Dam Weakness a Dozen Years Ago, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://perma.cc/Y3J7-RAJ4.
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brought significant damage to the spillway structure.18 Joined by others,
these same stakeholders are currently challenging the FERC relicensing due
to the unaddressed public safety concerns in addition to downstream
environmental impacts.19 As a result, Oroville Dam faces further relicensing
delays in consideration of the safety of the facility and other factors20 and
presumably increased scrutiny in how this facility will handle future
uncertainty in extreme climatic events.
Such scrutiny is important because FERC presently does not require
consideration of climate altered or non-stationary hydrology in its issuance
of hydropower operating licenses, which are issued for a period of thirty to
fifty years. The current re-licensing process administered by FERC appears
at odds with emerging best practices for climate change adaptation given
recent observations of extreme climatic events and the concurrent move
toward integrated water resources management and planning, which
promotes the coordinated development and management of water resources
to maximize social benefit while sustaining ecosystems.21 In California,
climate change adaptation strategies in integrated water resources
management have included improved conjunctive use of groundwater
through the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 201422 and
development of multi-benefit setback levees to mitigate extreme flood
events.23 In general, however, the best practices advocated by DWR through
its Climate Action Plan has not included specific recommendation for
changes to hydropower operations to plan and mitigate for extreme events,
such as flood and drought.24

18. Eric Holthaus, The Dam Truth: Climate Change Means More Lake
Orovilles, Grist (Feb. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/2QPY-9CAG.
19. Ryan Sabalow & Dale Kasler, Groups Demand Transparency on Oroville
Dam Spillway Repairs, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 19, 2017), https://
perma.cc/EPZ8-7GC6.
20. Motion to Intervene of Friends of the River Sierra Club South Yuba
Citizens League, supra note 18, at 14–16.
21. Jordi Gallego-Ayala, Trends in Integrated Water Resources Management
Research: A Literature Review, 15 WATER POLICY 628, 628–647 (2013).
22. Sustainable Groundwater Management Act; A.B. 1739, 2014 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); S.B. 1319, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); S.B. 1168,
2014 Leg., Reg. Sees. (Cal. 2014).
23. Ellen Hanak & Jay Lund, Adapting California’s Water Management to
Climate Change, CLIMATIC CHANGE, 2011, at 102.
24. See PERSPECTIVES AND GUIDANCE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ANALYSIS, Cal.
Dep’t of Water Res., 2015, https://perma.cc/5PBP-HHDY. (DWR recommends
stress testing with extreme scenarios, e.g., outside of observed record).
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Climate Change Adaptation in Water Resources Management
The water resources management sector has historically dealt with
climate variability and uncertainty in strategic ways. This adaptation is most
evident often during periods of floods or droughts when our water
management infrastructure is used to ameliorate imbalances in supply and
demand across space and time, where storing water for several years and
delivering it over 1000 km away is routine. For California, the construction
of numerous dams and aqueducts under the federal Central Valley Project
and the State Water Project during the middle of the 20th century was an
elaborate engineering approach to capturing and storing water from places
of supply and delivering it to places of demand. This infrastructure is a form
of longer-term adaptation to stationary climate signals,25 which often rely on
the assumption that observations from the historical record are sufficiently
robust to capture the range and variability of any future event. However,
non-stationary hydroclimatic trends challenge the underlying basis for static
approaches to water resource management.26
Recent non-stationary
behavior in hydroclimatic signals—such as increased frequency and severity
of droughts and decreasing trends in snowpack —have prompted the use of
adaptive management, which uses a shorter-term set of measures that
center on flexible operations, forecasting and innovative uses of existing
delivery and supply infrastructure to meet unexpected demands and
ameliorate hydroclimatic extremes.27 Used correctly, adaptive management
provides a framework for flexible decision-making in rapidly changing
environments as results from management actions become available or as
new information comes to light.28 The concept of adaptive management has
been discussed extensively for management of natural resources and water
management generally, and for climate change adaptation in particular.29

25. Eugene Z. Stakhiv, Pragmatic Approaches for Water Management Under
Climate Change Uncertainty, 47 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN WATER RESOURCES
ASSOCIATION 1183, 1186 (2011).
26. P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319
SCIENCE 573–574, 573 (2008)
27. National Research Council, Adaptive Management for Water Resources
Project Planning, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, (2004).
28. Kai N. Lee, Appraising Adaptive Management, in BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY:
BALANCING INTERESTS THROUGH ADAPTIVE COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT 1-26
(Louis E. Buck & Charles C. Geisler eds., 2001).
29. Id.; see also Claudia Pahl-Wostl, Transitions Towards Adaptive
Management of Water Facing Climate and Global Change, 21 WATER RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT 49, 49–62 (2007); see also Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting
Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning
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As applied in the financial sector, this framework includes periodic
“stress tests” and exercises to provide new information and response
strategies.30 Such stress tests quantitatively determine the reliability of
management structures, robustness of contingency actions, and overall
resilience of the study system.31 In the case of hydropower relicensing under
FERC, the formal development of study plans, which often include elements
of hydrodynamic modeling, is the only equivalent to stress testing afforded
by licensees to managing agencies and stakeholders.32

Remedies to Existing Relicensing
Climate change adaptation in the water resources sector is a formal or
informal response to changing environmental conditions and can be
infrastructure-based, e.g., reinforcing levees to buffer against floods of
higher magnitude and frequency, or more programmatic, e.g., incentivizing
flood protection measures via tax policy.33 Formal incorporation of adaptive
management in hydropower relicensing has been rare despite its apparent
suitability for water resource management in an era of hydroclimatic
change.34 This is not to say that relicensing does not provide opportunity for
improvement, as alterations to infrastructure and operations are routinely

Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 1–77 (2009); Robin K. Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”
- Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law. 34
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 9–73 (2010).
30. John Crabb, PRIMER: Dodd-Frank and Stress Testing, INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW, Sept. 22, 2017; see also Maxfield, supra note 1.
31. Id.
32. Here we draw a distinction between “stress testing” of FERC
licensed facilities for response management to non-stationary
hydroclimates, and the recent stress testing by the California Department of
Water Resources to evaluate structural integrity of dams statewide following
the Oroville Dam Spillway incident, as well as the stress testing by the State
Water Resources Control Board to evaluate conservation mandates imposed
on water agencies to ensure sufficient water to serve customers for several
years, based on average demand during the just-concluded 2012-2015
drought period. The stress testing advocated within the California Climate
Action Plan is more relevant. PERSPECTIVES AND GUIDANCE FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 3, 42, and 55.
33. Mac Taylor, Managing Floods in California, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST
REPORT (2017), https://perma.cc/NLN4-QPQG.
34. Michael Kiparsky, Anita Milman & Sebastian Vicuña, Climate and
Water: Knowledge of Impacts to Action on Adaption, 37 ANNUAL REVIEW OF
ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCES 163, 163–194 (2012).
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considered and implemented in relicensing under FERC’s request or
through settlement agreements.35 These adjustments can include new
investments in or rehabilitation of major infrastructure, as well as
modifications to operations and maintenance that are not limited to
incorporation of new regulations or altered operating conditions. However,
these adjustments are often made only at the outset of each license
issuance or renewal.36 This policy approach provides some measure of
surety to licensees from which to project future production and revenue for
the life of the license.37 The static nature and narrow view of this policy
prescription prevents programmatic responses to conditions and events
outside of previous experiences or in response to potential alternative
conditions.
At least two assumptions underlie the counter arguments to formal
inclusion climate change impact analysis as a standalone study plan. One,
even if hydroclimatic change effects were a clear and pressing issue, it would
be up to the licensee to effectively deal with its outcome. Two, if potential
hydroclimatic changes were directly affecting valued resources, they would
be mitigated for in the existing plant operations or in future relicensing
efforts. With respect to the former assumption, it has been argued that
leaving adaptation up to licensees risks failure without recourse, which is
unacceptable if the water management system is indeed too big to fail.38 With
respect to the second assumption, evidence that mitigation is taking place is
mixed, although there are instances where shortening license duration,
aggregation of licenses, or more aggressive requests to reopen a license has
been seen.

A.

Shortening Licenses

One potential remedy to limit negative effects of non-stationarity on
integrated water resources systems is to shorten the duration of hydropower
licenses, as locking in management conditions for three to five decades is
risky given mid-century hydroclimatic projections.39 Longer, fixed license

35. E.g., Colin Apse, John Banks, Laura R. Day, Jefferey J. Opperman &
Joshua Royte, The Penobscot River, Maine, USA: A Basin-Scale Approach to Balancing
Power Generation and Ecosystem Restoration, 16 ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY (2011).
36. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore all such
instances, this review is provocative in this sense. See Michael A. Swiger,
Ann P. Southwick & Stephanie L. Mairs, Paying for the Change: Can the FERC
Force Dam Decommissioning at Relicensing, 17 ENERGY L.J. 163 (1996).
37. Viers, supra note 3, at 655–661.
38. Id.
39. Kiparsky, supra note 34, 163–194.
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duration was intended to provide utilities with financial assurances via
operational longevity.40 Unfortunately, most early licenses were issued prior
to the establishment of key environmental laws, such as the federal
Endangered Species Act or Clean Water Act. Accordingly, the incorporation
of such laws into modern relicensing efforts has increased the length of time
for relicensure and thereby increased consulting costs, time, and resources
expended by resource agencies, stakeholders, and FERC staff. FERC has
revised its procedures in an effort to streamline processes, including its
recommended Integrated Licensing Process (ILP), which incorporates a priori
views of the various stakeholders along a strict timeline.41 Given the current
constraints of the ILP, there is little incentive for the licensee to embrace
change from the status quo.42 For example, it would be prudent to limit
licenses to a time envelope within which climate change is unlikely to
negatively impact hydropower generations, say thirty years.43 If the current
licensing period (thirty to fifty years) is deemed approriate to provide
utilities the necessary surety for investment, some intervening reassessment
should be made to determine if changes in hydroclimatic conditions have
occurred that necessitate some reevaluation of operational conditions.44

B.

Aggregation of Licenses

A second remedy to minimize the cumulative effect of hydropower
operations on downstream beneficial uses and provide a means for action
oriented climate change adaptation through coordinated reoperation is to
aggregate or at least coordinate licenses within a single basin.45 To a limited
degree this already happens, but it is at the discretion of the licensees.46
Given the complexity and cost of relicensing, there is a desire by licensees
and stakeholders to stagger licenses to limit an overload of commitment

40. Lea-Rachel D. Kosnik, Sources of Bureaucratic Delay: A Case Study of
FERC Dam Relicensing, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 258, 262–263. (2006).
41. Apse, supra note 35 and Viers, supra note 3, at 655–661.
42 Kaveh Madani, Hydropower licensing and climate change: Insights from
cooperative game theory. 34 ADVANCES IN WATER RESOURCES 174, 179–180 (Feb.
2011).
43. Id.
44. See Office of Energy Products Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, HYDROPOWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF HYDROPOWER BASICS
(2017); see also Sarah E. Null, David E. Rheinheimer & Joshua H. Viers,
Climate-Adaptive Water Year Typing for Instream Flow Requirements in California’s
Sierra Nevada, 142 J. WATER RESOURCES PLAN. AND MGMT. 11 (Nov. 2016).
45. Kiparsky, supra note 34, at 163–194.
46. Kosnik, supra note 40 at 258–288.
151

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2018

and engagement. On the other hand, as most licenses are now issued with
corresponding settlement agreements, there are increasing incentives to
bundle various commitments into a single, comprehensive approach.47 The
exclusion of federal facilities from such approaches remains problematic.

C.

Adaptive Licenses

While nearly all newly issued licenses include settlement agreements,
a few are now including formal steering committees, such as the Ecological
Resource Committees or ERCs that have been implemented in the
Mokelumne and Feather River watersheds.48
While the resulting
recommendations to the licensee can provide an effective, non-litigious
means to consider new information and adaptively alter operations, the
ERCs are operated by consensus, which may be difficult to achieve given the
many conflicting interests. Further, the licensee may have incentives to be
uncooperative given potential additional expenses or revenue loss resulting
from recommended actions.49 That being said, some ERC members, such as
federal land-owning agencies, have sufficient authority to enforce
recommendations to the extent that they fall within the jurisdiction of that
agency.

Needed Relicensing Reforms
While the existing relicensing process itself provides a basic
mechanism for adaptation, the existing framework has yielded few
substantive examples. During the relicensing period, numerous studies are
conducted to assess the potential environmental impacts of operations.
Formally incorporating climate change into the relicensing process is one
way to address the points raised here and by others regarding climate
change impacts on operations.50 For example, climate change impacts
studies could integrate assessments of updated knowledge about the
hydroclimatic record and updated hydroclimatic projections into operations
impact studies. Similar studies have been proposed to FERC, but rejected.51
Therefore, formal incorporation of hydroclimatic change into FERC
relicensing efforts will likely require reform of the process. Similar to

47. Apse, supra note 35.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 258–288.
50. D.E. Rheinheimer, S.M. Yarnell & J.H. Viers, Hydropower Costs of
Environmental Flows and Climate Warming in California’s Upper Yuba River Watershed,
29 RIVER RES. AND APPLICATIONS 1291, 1291–1305 (2013).
51. Viers, supra note 3, at 655–661.
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banking institutions that are now considered too big to fail by regulatory
authorities, reforms were made to the manner in which their financial
worthiness was assessed.52 Some of these institutional reforms have
resonance with hydropower relicensing, including stress testing,
performance monitoring, triggers for remediation, and escrow accounts.

A.

Stress Testing

In the financial sector, large institutions with multiple and complex
obligations and contingencies are now required to undergo “stress tests” to
determine if system shocks, either from outside events or internal decisionmaking, will compromise the ability of the institution to meet its
“downstream” obligations.53 These tests are conducted to quantitatively
determine the overall reliability of management structures, robustness of
contingency actions given perturbation, and overall resilience of the
institution.54 Outcomes from these tests identify means by which to reduce
relative risk and exposure to system shocks, and aid in the development of
preparedness and response strategies in the event of future adverse
conditions.55
Hydropower and water management institutions, with similarly
complex obligations to downstream beneficial uses, should have
comparable safety measures. In the case of hydropower relicensing under
FERC, however, the development of study plans is the only equivalent to
stress testing afforded by licensees to management agencies and
stakeholders. And while these study plans do include quantitative
approaches, including very detailed stream-reach flow studies and
operations modeling, they have yet to formally incorporate hydroclimatic
change.56 Reforming this oversight through formal stress testing within a
FERC relicensing purview could take many forms including: formal
environmental impact studies, more academic sensitivity analyses, or

52. Maxfield, supra note 1.
53. Downstream is used here in both the figurative sense (i.e.,
cascading financial failures enabled by overleverage, such as the collapse of
Bear Stearns) and literal sense as defined by the financial industry (i.e.,
consumers of financial products). See Anita K. Krug, Downstream Securities
Regulation, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1589 (2014).
54. Maxfield, supra note 1.
55. Id.
56. Peter B. Moyle, Joseph D. Kiernan & John G. Williams, Improving
Environmental Flow Methods Used in California Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Relicensing, HYDROPOWER REFORM COALITION (2011).
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development of climate-informed worst-case scenario planning into existing
study plans.

B.

Performance Monitoring

Relicensing is a process that includes thorough stakeholder
engagement, consultation with resource specialists, advice from well-staffed
legal teams, etc., and one that is ostensibly intended to ensure that licensed
operating conditions do not cause extraordinary harm to valued
environmental or cultural resources.57 Despite the extraordinary effort and
money directed toward relicensing, the requirements for post-licensure
performance monitoring are comparatively negligible. Stated differently,
requirements for post-licensure environmental monitoring in hydropower
licenses are commonplace, but are not used in an adaptive manner.58 Study
requirements are often short term and like other license conditions, the
monitoring requirements must be supported by a clear nexus to
operations.59 Further, licenses typically do not specify any consequences
based on the outcome of studies or monitoring, though the formation of
ERCs could alleviate this limitation.

C.

Triggers for Remediation

Performance monitoring is useful to the extent it exposes management
strategies that fail to meet the objectives of integrated water resources
systems. In the event that sub-optimal strategies are identified, remedial
actions must be taken. Milestones or triggers need to be established so that
during monitoring of system performance, managers can recommend
remedial actions if objectives are not being met. In the case of California’s
water resources, the spillway and emergency spillway failures at Oroville
Dam in 2017 are indicative of a triggering event requiring remediation,
because by explicit intent FERC is responsible for implementing regulations,
supervising inspections, and approving action plans intended to safeguard
the public from catastrophic emergencies “defined in the regulations as an
impending or actual sudden release of water at the project caused by natural
disaster, accident, or failure of project works.”60 It is unclear, however, if
substantive changes will be made to reservoir and hydropower operations
following this event despite the desire of stakeholders to improve
safeguards for public safety and limit degradation to the environment.

57. Viers, supra note 50.
58. Id.
59. Kosnik, supra note 40.
60. Viers, supra note 50.
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D.

Escrow Accounts to Maintain Liquidity

One of the chief lessons of the financial crisis is that systems that are
too big to fail often imply private profit but, in the event of system failure,
require public bailouts. In other words, the profit is private but the risk is
public. This paradox can be seen in the hydropower context as the public
largely depends on a group of large, complex, quasi-private entities to
manage a necessary public good (i.e., water). A major remedial action
following the financial sector meltdown is that financial institutions found
to be overleveraged or insufficiently liquid via stress tests or performance
monitoring are now required to maintain higher levels of capital to protect
against system failure, and to limit cascading impacts on downstream
dependents.61 In the context of hydropower, an analogous recommendation
would require hydropower operators to maintain escrow accounts with
preset liquidity so that in the event of an emergency, the burden of
remediation would be borne by the licensee rather than the public. This
would not only enable rapid response in the event of an emergency, but
could also finance adaptive management approaches to identifying,
understanding, and remedying changing environmental conditions due to
extreme hydroclimatic events. Further, these accounts could eventually be
used in the event of project decommissioning to offset the large and largely
publically financed costs of doing so.62

Conclusion
While in principle water resources management has evolved over time
to reduce vulnerability and enhance system resiliency given high uncertainty
of increased demands and diminished supplies, underlying assumptions
have not. Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, assumptions of
hydroclimatic stationarity remain.63 Further, operational rules, such as those
employed at Oroville Dam for flood control and reservoir releases, remain
indexed to a previous hydrologic era. At the end of the day, licensees and

61. Maxfield, supra note 1.
62. Dominique R. Scalia, I’ll Take the Benefits If You Pay the Costs: Weighing
the Equities of Public and Private Funding Sources for Hydroelectric Dam
Decommissioning, 2 AM. INDIAN L.J. 2.
63. Stakhiv, supra note 29; see also R. J. Watts, B. D. Watts, J. J. Opperman
& K. H. Bowmer, Dam Reoperation in an Era of Climate Change, 62 MARINE &
FRESHWATER RES. 321, 321–327 (2011); Jamie Pittock & Joerg Hartmann, Taking
a Second Look: Climate Change, Periodic Re-Licensing and Better Management of Old
Dams, 62 MARINE & FRESHWATER RES. 312, 312–320 (2011).
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stakeholders alike will only embrace anticipatory adaptation to the extent
that scientific tools and underlying data can transcend institutional and
regulatory barriers. While all relicensing parties have a need to embrace
transparency and to seek license measures that are clear and enforceable, it
is clear that socioeconomic and environmental values are different today
than they were at the initial issuance of most FERC licenses. Further, the
technological leaps being made today are beyond the imagination of anyone
thirty to fifty years prior. Therefore, it is safe to assume that our knowledge
and skill will only improve in the coming decades and that the remedies and
reforms to relicensing presented here may be moot. However, until more
comprehensive approaches such as integrated water resource management
frameworks are more generally embraced, effective governance will remain
elusive and institutional conflicts will prevail.64

64. Casey Brown, The End of Reliability, 136 J. WATER RESOURCES PLAN. AND
MGMT. 143, 143–45 (2010).
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